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Abstract
A compensation fund is an effective mechanism for ensuring the protection of indi-
vidual investors’ investments on the stock market, which confirms the experience of 
different countries both with the developed stock market and with the emerging mar-
kets (USA, UK, France, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Ireland, Malta).
The formation of a steady interest of individual investors in stock market instruments 
is stimulated by the implementation of a mechanism for guaranteeing such invest-
ments. The stock market of Ukraine faces the problem of attracting additional financ-
ing, while individual investors have fairly large amounts of monetary resources that 
are not involved in the transactions with financial instruments due to the high level of 
distrust caused by the crisis phenomena on both the global and the national financial 
markets. The creation of the Ukrainian compensation fund for investment protection 
involves the development and implementation of a nationwide system for protecting 
the property interests of investors on the stock market, which requires compensatory 
payments to the clients of all professional market participants as a result of certain risks.
The main condition for effective functioning of the compensation fund of the stock 
market is determined by its size, which must meet the following conditions of optimal-
ity: to ensure the minimum level of the fund’s risks, to take into account the amounts of 
contributions for the current period, the amount of maintenance costs and to fulfil the 
requirements for the financial stability of the fund. A modified Markowitz portfolio 
model was used to build the model. 
The building of the target function and constraints was carried out by using the Statistica 
software toolkit. The target function and constraints were presented as polynomials of 
the third degree and calculated with the help of the multiple nonlinear regression. As 
a result of calculations, an optimization model was developed for determining the size 
of the compensation fund taking into account these conditions.
The model’s testing was carried out by using the examples of the Deposit Guarantee 
Fund (DGF) and compensation funds of the United States, Great Britain, France, 
Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Ireland and Malta. As a result of calculations we determined 
the size of the compensation fund, which guarantees a minimum level of the fund’s risk 
taking into account the amount of contributions for the current period, the amount of 
maintenance costs and requirements to the financial stability of the fund.
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INTRODUCTION
According to Chernadchuk, Sukhonos, and Shkolnyk (2017), modern 
world financial architecture mainly involves the formation of finan-
cial systems according to two models, namely bank-based and market-
based, which is a prerequisite for the historically driven development 
of financial regulation.
© Inna Shkolnyk, Eugenia 
Bondarenko, Myroslav Ostapenko, 
2017
Inna Shkolnyk, Dr., Professor, Head 
of Department of Finance, Banking 
and Insurance, Sumy State University, 
Ukraine.
Eugenia Bondarenko, Assistant, 
Department of Finance, Banking and 
Insurance, Sumy State University, 
Ukraine.
Myroslav Ostapenko, Ph.D. Student, 
Department of Finance, Banking and 
Insurance, Sumy State University, 
Ukraine.
This is an Open Access article, 
distributed under the terms of the 
Creative Commons Attribution-Non-
Commercial 4.0 International license, 
which permits re-use, distribution, 
and reproduction, provided the 
materials aren’t used for commercial 
purposes and the original work is 
properly cited.
stock market, investment protection, individual 
investors, compensation fund, optimization
Keywords
JEL Classification G28, G32
2Investment Management and Financial Innovations, Volume 14, Issue 3, 2017
Ukraine has a number of criteria according to which the country’s financial system can be defined as 
a bank-centered one, but taking into account the National Bank of Ukraine’s policy on the banking 
system purgation, a significant part of depositors lost their savings, which led to a decrease in trust and 
outflow of depositors from banks. It should be noted that this problem is characteristic not only for 
Ukraine, but also for a number of European countries, as well as for the Asian region countries. At first, 
the financial crisis of 2008, and then further crisis phenomena did not contribute to restoring confi-
dence in the Ukraine’s banking system, despite guarantee fund for individuals. The problems of deposit 
insurance and its impact on the financial stability of the country and the region as a whole are becoming 
more widespread in the researches from different countries and different regions. So, Malaysian schol-
ars Suhal Kusairi, Nur Azura Sanusi, Abdul Ghafar Ismail (2015) examine the effects of deposit insur-
ance on the banking system in the Asian region. On the other hand, research findings in other countries, 
in particular in the Slovak Republic, indicate there is a significant amount of investment and financial 
products that can be used to capitalize savings, while investors prefer a more traditional form of capital-
ization – savings accounts in banks (Meheš, Stašková, Feranecová, & Ragániová, 2016).
In Ukraine, unlike the Slovak Republic, proposal for investment and financial products is extremely 
limited, which leads to an increase in risks of depositors who are able to save their funds only in depos-
its. In such a situation, stock market could be a possible alternative to the funds distribution for both 
the population and enterprises, provided that there would be a certain compensatory mechanism that 
would protect depositors’ interests through the protection of professional stock market participants’ in-
terests, similarly to both in the banking system of Ukraine and in most banking systems of other coun-
tries. In such a case, one can agree with Muhammad Mahboob Ali, Aviral Kumar Tiwari and Naveed 
Raza (2017) that the functioning of the stock market and the banking system are closely interconnected, 
especially in countries where the stock market is only in the forming stage and does not have a signifi-
cant impact on the state of the economy, besides, it is characterized by negative phenomena such as 
opacity, corruption, high speculative operations and fraud.
In this context, one of the effective mechanisms for ensuring the protection of investments of individual 
investors on the stock market is the creation of a compensation fund. The existence of such a fund is 
an additional incentive for making a decision about investment on the stock market. The internal long-
term investors form the basis for the market’s stability. That is why their presence is extremely impor-
tant. Compensation schemes have an extensive experience of effective operations in many countries 
with developed stock markets (USA, Canada, France, UK, Hong Kong, Australia, Singapore, Japan, etc.) 
and on emerging markets (Argentina, Brazil, Korea, South Africa, Malaysia, Mexico, Bulgaria, etc.).
In some countries, a compensation scheme involves a wider range of risks, for example, in Australia, the 
program protects against non-fulfillment of contracts, in the UK and the US – from certain fraudulent 
actions. However, such programs do not protect investments from the usual market risks, from the fall-
ing of the market value of securities. Mike Dempsey, Xiaofeng Shi Huu Nhan Duong, Petko S. Kalev 
(2015), Alisia J. Davis (2007), Adam C. Pritchard (1999), Thomas W. Joo (1999) examine the problems of 
supervision over the activity of financial intermediaries – brokers and dealers, as well as the problems 
of fraud on the stock market and the possible ways to deal with them. Compensation schemes provide 
the insurance of investments of individual investors. Inaccessibility of investments (monetary resources 
and securities) implies that they cannot be returned to individual investors as a result of insolvency 
(bankruptcy) of professional stock market participants.
The stock market of Ukraine encounters the problem of attracting additional financing: both from ex-
ternal and internal sources. The lack of free financial resources, which can be used for stock market op-
erations, is related to the protracted political and economic instability. A significant source of additional 
financing for the stock market may become temporarily available free funds of domestic and foreign 
individual investors (Slav’yuk, Shkvarchuk, Kondrat, 2017). At the same time, increasingly relevant are 
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the processes of convergence on the financial market, which create even more opportunities for finan-
cial intermediaries and individual investors, but which are accompanied by increased risks (Kozmenko, 
Pakhnenko, 2012).
In order to create a steady interest of individual investors in stock market instruments, it is necessary 
to develop and implement the mechanisms for guaranteeing such investments that will stimulate the 
development of the stock market. According to the foreign experience, a compensation fund is one of 
the most effective measures for attracting individual investors to the stock market, along with tax incen-
tives, the introduction of an institute of investment consultants and the implementation of programs 
to increase the level of financial literacy of the population. The creation of the Ukrainian compensation 
fund for investment protection involves the development and implementation of a nationwide system 
for protecting the property interests of investors on the stock market, which requires compensatory 
payments to the clients of all professional market participants as a result of certain risks (1). Ukraine 
has some experience of compensation funds in the form of the Deposit Guarantee Fund (DGF), which 
essentially serves as a bank deposit insurance (Shkolnyk, Bukhtiarova, 2015), but only the first steps are 
taken towards the creation of a compensation fund.
The basic document governing the creation and functioning of compensation schemes for the EU coun-
tries is the 1997 Directive of the European Union (Directive 97/9/EC). On the basis of this document, 
national normative documents and regulatory mechanisms for each EU country are developed. Due to 
the fact that Ukraine has committed itself to bring its national legislation in line with the legislation of 
the European Union, it is necessary to implement the Directive 97/9/EC of the European Parliament of 
March 3, 1997 “On investor-compensation schemes”.
We can conclude that the Ukrainian stock market requires the creation of a similar compensation fund, 
which will increase the interest of individual investors in market instruments and help accelerate its de-
velopment, because it has already been proved that the level of protection of investors’ interests on the 
market directly affects its development, including the liquidity of the market.
The size of the fund depends on the probability of emergence of foundations for the payment of com-
pensations. In general, it should be at least 5-10% of the size of the maximum guarantees. The size of the 
maximum guarantees is the total amount of monetary resources and securities of individual investors 
on the accounts of the fund’s members (professional stock market participants). The resources of the 
fund must be formed to the extent that it can compensate all losses of unqualified individual investors 
that arise as a result of inability of the fund’s member to return the money and securities belonging to 
the client.
A compensation fund is an integral part of the protection system of retail customers, which also in-
cludes a risk-based supervision. The participation of state authorities in the field of the stock market and 
self-regulated organizations in the system of such supervision will minimize the likelihood of payments 
from the fund, and, hence, the financing by the conscientious and more stable members of the fund of 
less stable members. Investor protection programs are effective only under the condition of adequate 
supervision and regulation of the activities of professional stock market participants. Without this, the 
costs of supporting the programs and paying compensations to clients of insolvent and unscrupulous 
companies are excessively high and may exceed the potential of the conscientious market participants.
The main source of replenishment of such fund is the contributions of its members. For Ukraine, it 
would be advisable to introduce the following types of contributions: admission, quarterly (to be ad-
justed according to the risk profile of the fund member) and additional contributions in the event of 
the fund’s deficit. The calculation of the size of contributions should be made by using economic and 
mathematical methods taking into account the specific features of activities of the fund’s members 
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on the stock market, the volume of the carried out transactions and the ability of the members to pay 
contributions.
It is also necessary to grant the fund the right to invest its temporarily available free funds and to obtain 
credit resources in case of the fund’s deficit.
Since one of the most important indicators of the activity of any compensation fund is an indicator of its 
size, its management is faced with the task of ensuring its effective functioning, which implies the fund’s 
ability to make compensatory payments at any time and in any amount. A precondition for effective 
functioning of any compensation fund is the calculation of its optimal size. An optimal size is the size, 
which ensures the minimal level of the fund’s risk taking into account the contributions for the current 
period, the maintenance costs and the requirements of the fund’s financial stability.
1. OUTPUT DATA OF 
RESEARCH
For the purpose of this study, we have used the in-
formation about compensation funds around the 
world, in particular: The Investor Compensation 
Fund (Bulgaria), Securities Investor Protection 
Corporation (United States of America), Investor 
Compensation Fund (Czech Republic), Financial 
Services Compensation Scheme (Great Britain). 
The Funds of the Guarantees for Dépôts et de 
Résolution (France), Investor Compensation 
Company Limited (Ireland) and Investor 
Compensation Scheme (Malta). Considering that 
in Ukraine, there is no such fund yet, in order to 
calculate and determine the optimal size of the 
fund, we used the information on the financial 
condition of professional participants of the do-
mestic stock market and the data of the Deposit 
Guarantee Fund. The output data for the optimi-
zation model for each individual compensation 
fund vary, that is, the periods for which the infor-
mation for calculations is derived are different and 
depend on the number of years of the fund’s func-
tioning and the availability of information about 
its operations. All data for the calculations were 
taken only from the official reports of such funds, 
which guarantees their reliability.
2. METHODOLOGY
The calculation of the optimal size of a particular 
compensation fund is carried out by taking into 
account certain constraints (conditional optimi-
zation). In our study, the basis for the optimiza-
tion model is a classic Markowitz portfolio model, 
which is an approach based on the analysis of the 
expected average values and variations of random 
variables. The Markowitz model is aimed at cre-
ating an investment portfolio consisting of assets 
that meet certain criteria for the risk/return ratio. 
The expected return on the portfolio as a whole is 
defined as the average value of the distribution of 
return on the assets that form the portfolio. The 
expected portfolio risk is a standard deviation of 
the possible values of returns from their math-
ematical expectation. Therefore, the goal of the 
Markowitz model is to select the optimal invest-
ment portfolio from a set of possible portfolios.
It is assumed that in selecting a portfolio from two 
portfolios with the same expected return, an in-
vestor chooses a lower risk portfolio. Aiming to si-
multaneously maximize the expected profitability 
and to minimize uncertainties (risks) an investor 
has two goals that are contradictory and which 
should be balanced. The Markowitz approach 
makes it possible to take into account these two 
goals at the same time. 
Since in our case we do not have to choose an in-
vestment portfolio, it is necessary to transform 
the Markowitz model in accordance with the re-
search needs. The optimization model can have 
two tasks: direct and inverse. The direct task is to 
find the maximum value of any economic value, 
usually of income or profitability. The inverse task, 
on the contrary, is aimed at minimizing the risks 
of a particular economic phenomenon.
The optimization model in its general form has 
the following structure: the target function, the 
feasible region and the system of constraints that 
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determine this area. At the same time, the target 
function consists of three elements: controllable 
variables, uncontrollable variables, forms of the 
function (the type of dependence between con-
trollable and uncontrollable variables).
The building of the optimization econometric 
model requires the implementation of six stages. 
During the first stage, we will define optimization 
tasks for our study. Since the task of the optimiza-
tion model can be defined both as the finding of 
the maximal and the minimal economic value, we 
will consider which of these tasks is relevant for 
determining the optimal amount of any compen-
sation fund. When setting the maximal task, we 
obtain the maximum value of the compensation 
fund if certain conditions are met, but the maxi-
mum value of the compensation fund is not its op-
timal value from the point of view of ensuring the 
implementation of the fund’s functions and main-
taining an adequate financial burden on the fund’s 
members. Therefore, it is necessary to set the min-
imal task, not the minimal size of the compensa-
tion fund, but the minimal risk of changes in the 
size of such fund. The changing size of the fund is 
calculated by us as a standard deviation (sample 
variance), which is calculated by the formula:
( )2
1
1 .
n
i
i
S x x
n =
= −∑  (1)
Thus, an optimization model for determining the 
size of the funds hould be aimed at minimizing 
the risk of changes in the compensation fund sub-
ject to certain restrictions.
At the second stage, it is necessary to determine 
the variables of the optimization model. After 
analyzing the activities of compensation funds in 
more than 10 countries of the world, we came to 
the conclusion that the following factors influence 
the determination of the size of the fund: the size 
of the estimated expenditures of the fund, the con-
tributions of the fund’s participants (introducto-
ry, regular, special), the amount of compensation 
payments, as well as the ratio of the fund’s size to 
the size of assets subject to the fund’s insurance.
Accordingly, we have selected the variables that 
should be part of the model: y  – the risk of 
changes in the fund’s size (standard deviation of 
the fund’s size); x  – the size of the compensation 
fund; c  – contributions of the fund’s members; e  
– operating (estimated) expenses; a  – the size of 
assets insured by the compensation fund. In the 
model, we do not take into account the size of 
compensatory payments, because they are difficult 
to predict and it is impossible to determine their 
boundaries. This is due to the fact that in one peri-
od, there will be no compensatory payments at all, 
or they will be minimal, and in the other period, 
compensatory payments will be substantial. Both 
situations are normal for the compensation fund.
At the fourth stage, it is necessary to build a struc-
tural model in its general form. The objective 
function of the optimization model is the depen-
dence of the risk of changes in the size of the com-
pensation fund ( )y  on the size of such compensa-
tion fund ( )x  that can be described with the help 
of a multiple nonlinear regression. The following 
factor features were determined: ,x  cos x  and 
sin ,x  which are described by a polynomial func-
tion of the third degree, since the polynomials of 
different degrees optimally describe the economic 
phenomena and processes. Therefore, the target 
function of the optimization model looks like this:
2 3
0 1 2 3 4
2 3
5 6 7
2 3
8 9
cos
cos cos sin
sin sin ,
y b b x b x b x b x
b x b x b x
b x b x
= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +
+ ⋅ + ⋅
 (2)
where 0b  is a constant term of the model; ib  – the 
model parameters characterizing the influence of 
each factor on the resulting sign, ( )1.9 .i∈
After determining the target function, it is neces-
sary to define a system of constraints that will help 
us determine the optimal size of a specific compen-
sation fund. The first constraint relates to the size 
of contributions of the fund’s members. To deter-
mine the left side of the first constraint, it is neces-
sary to calculate the multiple nonlinear regression 
that describes the dependence of contributions 
( )c  on the size of the fund ( ) ,x  cos x and sin x
. The amount of contributions (the left side) should 
be more than 80% of their mathematical expecta-
tion ( )( )M c  – the right side of inequality. 
The second and the third constraints are related 
to the size of operating expenses of the compen-
6Investment Management and Financial Innovations, Volume 14, Issue 3, 2017
sation fund. The left side of both constraints is a 
function of dependence of the size of operating 
costs ( )e  on the size of the fund ( ) ,x  cos x  and 
sin .x  The left side should be less than 120% of the 
maximum size of transaction costs ( )( )max e  for 
the researched period (the right part of the second 
constraint) and more than 80% of the mathemati-
cal expectation of operating costs ( )( )M e  (the 
right part of the third constraint).
The fourth constraint of the system characterizes 
the requirement of financial stability of the com-
pensation fund. The financial soundness of the 
compensation fund is calculated as the ratio be-
tween the size of the fund ( )x  and the volume of 
the insured assets a  (formula 3). According to the 
international practice of the functioning of similar 
funds, the index of financial stability should be in 
the range from 5 to 10%. For Ukraine, it is pro-
posed to set a standard – not lower than 5%.
100%,ii
i
FRFS
GIPP
= ⋅  (3)
where 
iFS  – financial stability of the compensa-
tion fund as of the beginning of the -thi  month;
iFR  – the sum of financial resources of the com-
pensation fund at the beginning of the month and 
the fees of its members that must be received dur-
ing the -thi  month;
GIPP  – the guaranteed amount of investments 
of physical persons on the stock market (monetary 
resources and securities on the accounts of mem-
bers of the compensation fund belonging to indi-
vidual investors) determined as of the beginning 
of the -thi  month. 
The fifth and the sixth constraints indicate that 
the size of the fund ( )x  and the risk of changes in 
the size of the fund ( )y  should be positive values.
Therefore, in general terms, we obtain the follow-
ing optimization model:
2 3
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 (4)
where 0d  and 0g  are constant terms in constraint 
functions; id  and ig  – parameters of constraint 
functions characterizing the influence of each fac-
tor on the resulting sign, ( )1.9 .i∈
Problem formulation for the optimization task in 
this form will make it possible to calculate the op-
timal size of the compensation fund if the speci-
fied conditions are met.
Implementation of the fifth and the sixth stage is 
possible only by solving the optimization task on 
the example of the specific compensation funds.
In order to determine the reliability of the pro-
posed model, it is necessary to test it by using an 
example of the existing compensation funds.
3. FINDINGS
It was decided to calculate the optimal amount of 
the Deposit Guarantee Fund due to the fact that 
this fund is a compensation fund and has more 
than 15 years of experience in Ukraine. In addi-
tion, we propose to create a fund for guaranteeing 
investments of individuals’ on the stock market on 
the basis of the Deposit Guarantee Fund. Output 
data for calculations are given in Table 1.
To build an optimization model for the Deposit 
Guarantee Fund, we need to build three regression 
7Investment Management and Financial Innovations, Volume 14, Issue 3, 2017
equations (multiple nonlinear regression): for the 
target function and the first three constraints of 
the model. In order to perform calculations, it was 
decided to use the Statistica software instruments, 
which made it possible to assess the adequacy of 
the obtained functions and to determine the level 
of statistical significance of their parameters. 
After the introduction of the variables, the pro-
gram makes all the necessary calculations, the 
results of which for the target function of the 
Deposit Guarantee Fund are given in formula 5 
and in Table 2 and Figure 1. 
The determination coefficient ( )2R  is 0.95, which 
is more than 0.75 and indicates a strong correlation 
between the resulting variable and predictors, as 
well as the importance of the constant term. On the 
basis of the data in Table 2, we see that for the non-
linear regression equation, the forward stepwise 
method includes the following variables: the vol-
ume of the fund ( ) ,x  the volume of the fund cubed 
( )3 ,x  and does not include the other six variables 
( )2 2 3 2 3,  cos ,  cos ,  cos ,  sin ,  sin .x x x x x x  
The target function of the optimization model for 
the Deposit Guarantee Fund is as follows: 
3139.708 0.2065 0.0000000006
135.5852 sin min .
y x x
x
= + ⋅ − ⋅ +
+ ⋅ →
 (5)
One of the conditions for the correct use of regres-
sion analysis is the conformity of the law of distri-
bution of excesses to the normal law. According 
Table 1. Output data for calculating the optimal size of the Deposit Guarantee Fund for 2006–2016
Year
The amount 
of the Deposit 
Guarantee Fund, 
mln. UAH 
( )x
The total amount of 
contributions of the fund 
members (initial and 
regular), mln. UAH 
( )c
The sum of 
operational 
expenses of the 
fund, mln. UAH 
( )e
Total amount of assets 
subject to insurance 
(deposits of physical 
persons), bln. UAH 
( )a
Standard 
deviation of 
the fund’s 
size  
( )y
2006 629.7 2635.7 10.13 67900 230.04
2007 867 2874 11.75 100400 359.16
2008 1335.5 3343.5 11.91 155200 1113.82
2009 2987.3 4996.3 12.75 204900 1486.78
2010 4302.7 6312.7 13.32 198000 673.94
2011 3390.3 5401.3 24.33 254200 727.17
2012 4827.3 6839.3 23.29 282600 1351.81
2013 6092.1 8105.1 33.19 338500 1232.94
2014 7292.9 9306.9 38 402600 5908.07
2015 16872.6 18887.6 55.89 382100 4927.29
2016 14084.4 16100.4 100.79 362300 1397.26
Table 2. The results of regression for the standard deviation of the size of the Deposit Guarantee 
Fund ( )y  from its volume ( )x
9N =
Regression results for the dependent variable: y  (target function of the Deposit Guarantee Fund) 
0.97591681;R =  2 0.95241363.R =  Corrected 2 0.92386180.R =   
( )3,5 33.357;F =  .00099.p <  Standard error of assessment: 141.94.
BETA Standard error BETA B Standard error B ( )5t -levelp
Constant term – – 139.7080 82.00172 1.70372 0.149160
x 1.768949 0.228299 0.2065 0.02666 7.74839 0.000572
3x –0,998255 0.229553 –0.0000 0.00000 –4.34869 0.007368
sin x 0.200228 0.098953 135.5852 67.00683 2.02345 0.098934
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to Figure 2, we can conclude that due to the small 
number of observations, the distribution of ex-
cesses does not conform to the normal law. 
In general, based on the results of the regression 
analysis, we can make a conclusion about the high 
level of adequacy of the model for the dependence 
of deviation of the size of the Deposit Guarantee 
Fund ( )y  on its volume ( ).x
Similarly, calculations were made to determine the 
functions of constraints. The results of the calcula-
tions of the dependence of contributions from the 
members of the Deposit Guarantee Fund ( )c  on 
the volume of the fund ( )x  (the function of the 
first constraint) are shown in Table 3 and Figures 2.
According to the data in Table 3, the function of 
the first constraint of the model for the Deposit 
Guarantee Fund is as follows:
3
2
109.0465 0.1315 0.0000000018
0.000034 .
c x x
x
= + ⋅ − ⋅ +
+ ⋅
 (6)
The compliance of regression analysis (contribu-
tions from members of the Deposit Guarantee 
Fund ( )c  from the volume of the fund ( )x  of the 
law of distribution of excesses to the normal law is 
shown in Figure 4.
Figure 1. Distribution of excesses for the regression of standard deviation of the size of the Deposit 
Guarantee Fund ( )y  from its volume ( )x
Distribution: Excesses
Expected normal
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Table 3. The results of regression of contributions from the members of the Deposit Guarantee Fund 
( )c  from its volume ( )x
14N =
Regression results for the dependent variable: c  (contributions of the Deposit Guarantee Fund) 
0.98657002;R =  2 0.97332040.R =  Corrected 2 0.96531652.R =   
( )3,10 121.61;F =  .00000.p <  Standard error of assessment: 217.81.
BETA Standard error BETA B
Standard error 
B ( )10t -levelp
Constant term – – 109.0465 115.9378 0.94056 0.369095
x 0.58435 0.391347 0.1315485808 0.0881 1.49317 0.166255
3x –2.20359 0.824826 –0.0000000018 0.0000 –2.67158 0.023429
2x 2.49838 1.164030 0.0000339039 0.0000 2.14632 0.057420
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The results of calculations of the dependence 
of estimated costs of the Deposit Guarantee 
Fund ( )e  on the volume of the fund ( )x  are 
shown in Table 4 and Figure 3.
According to the data in Table 4, the func-
tion of the second and third constraints of the 
model for the Deposit Guarantee Fund is as 
follows:
3
0.1308 0.0047 40.6892 sin
44.4162 (sin ) .
e x x
x
= + ⋅ − ⋅ +
+ ⋅
 (7)
The compliance of regression analysis (esti-
mated costs of the Deposit Guarantee Fund c  
from the volume of the fund ( )x  of the law of 
distribution of excesses to the normal law is 
shown in Figure 6.
As a result of calculations we have built the follow-
ing optimization model for the Deposit Guarantee 
Fund:
3139.708 0.2065 0.0000000006
135.5852 sin min,
y x x
x
= + ⋅ − ⋅ +
+ ⋅ →
 
Figure 2. Distribution of excesses for the regression of contributions of members of the Deposit 
Guarantee Fund ( )c  from its volume ( )x
Distribution: Excesses
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Table 4. The results of regression of the estimated costs of the Deposit Guarantee Fund ( )e  from its 
volume ( )x
11N =
Regression results for the dependent variable: e  (estimated costs of the Deposit Guarantee Fund) 
.93352002;R =  2 .87145963.R =  Corrected 2 .81637090.R =   
( )3,7 15.819;F =  .00168.p <  Standard error of assessment: 11.705.
BETA Standard error BETA B Standard error B ( )7t -levelp
Constant term – – 0.1308 5.69651 0.02297 0.982317
x 0.91125 0.137212 0.0047 0.00071 6.64117 0.000293
sin x –1.09302 0.431249 –40.6892 16.05386 –2.53454 0.038973
3sin x  0.97115 0.432057 44.4162 19.76036 2.24774 0.059396
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3
2
3
3
109.0465 0.1315 0.0000000018
0.000034 1149.44
0.1308 0.0047 40.6892 sin
44.4162 (sin ) 120.95
0.1308 0.0047 40.6892 sin
44.4162 (sin ) 24.39
0.025
, 0.
c x x
x
e x x
x
e x x
x
x
a
x y
 = + ⋅ − ⋅ +

+ ⋅ ≥
 = + ⋅ − ⋅ +

+ ⋅ ≤

 = + ⋅ − ⋅ +

+ ⋅ ≥

 ≥

 ≥
 
(8)
The fourth constraint characterizing the financial 
stability of the compensation funds should not 
be higher than 5% (the recommended interna-
tional level), but 2.%, since this norm is set for the 
Deposit Guarantee Fund by law.
Having obtained an optimization model for the 
Deposit Guarantee Fund, we can move to the fifth 
and the sixth stages of the model realization: elab-
oration of the development model and solution of 
the problem, as well as analysis of the optimal so-
lution (checking it for adequacy and compliance 
with economic reality).
The model was developed with the help of the 
“Search for a solution” tool in the MS Excel pro-
gram (Figure X.1). The data obtained as a result of 
implementation of the scientific and methodologi-
cal approach to optimizing the size of the Deposit 
Guarantee Fund are given in Table 5.
On the basis of calculations given in Table 5, it can 
be concluded that as of January1, 2017, the opti-
mal value of the Deposit Guarantee Fund amount-
ed to 17999,76 million UAH. For the fund of this 
size, the contributions of its members amounted to 
29994,54 million UAH and operating expenses – to 
81 m.,047, which is more than 2.5% proscribed by 
law approaching the recommended rate of 5%. We 
also calculated the amount of contributions to the 
fund, administrative costs, the ratio of the fund’s 
size to the volume of insured assets, as well as the 
value of the target function for the period 2006–
2016. The value of the fund’s size for calculations 
was used for the same period.
Similar calculations were made for invest-
ment compensation funds in other countries: 
The Investor Compensation Fund, Bulgaria 
(Appendix, Table 1), Securities Investor Protection 
Corporation, United States of America (Appendix 
A, Table 2), Investor Compansation Fund, Czech 
Republic (Appendix, Table 3), Financial Services 
Compensation Scheme, United Kingdom 
(Appendix, Table 4), The Fonds de garantie des 
dépôts et de résolution, France (Appendix, Table 
5), Investor Compensation Company Limited, 
Ireland (Appendix, Table 6) and Investor 
Compensation Scheme, Malta (Appendix, Table 7).
Figure 3. Distribution of excesses for the regression of estimated costs of the Deposit Guarantee 
Fund ( )e  from the volume of the fund ( )x
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CONCLUSION
The optimization model, which we have obtained, is somewhat narrow, since for our calculations, we 
used only open statistical information. But this methodological approach can be extended by the man-
agement of such fund, because they have access to all the information about its operations used to 
calculate its optimal size. The building of regression models for the dependence of the fund’s size on a 
bigger number of variables will make it possible to create a model that will more adequately describe the 
economic reality and will yield more accurate results.
On the basis of calculations made for the Deposit Guarantee Fund, we can conclude that the proposed 
scientific and methodological approach to determining the optimal size of the fund makes it possible to 
determine the size of the compensation fund, which guarantees a minimum level of the fund’s risk tak-
ing into account the amount of contributions for the current period, the amount of maintenance costs 
and the requirements for the fund’s financial stability.
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APPENDIX. RESULTS OF TESTING OF THE SCIENTIFIC  
AND METHODICAL APPROACH TO DETERMINING  
THE OPTIMAL SIZE OF THE COMPENSATION FUND
1. THE INVESTOR COMPENSATION FUND (BULGARIA)
Table 1a. The results of regression of the standard deviation of the size of the Investor Compensation 
Fund (Bulgaria) ( )y  from its volume ( )x
8N =
Regression results for dependent variable: risk  (data matrix 1) 
.96642941;R =  2 .93398580.R =  Corrected 2 .88447515.R =   
( )3, 4 18.864;F =  .00799.p <  Standard error of estimate: .19486.
BETA
Standard 
error 
BETA
B Standard error B ( )4t -levelp
Free term – – 0.968081 0.393536 2.45995 0.069695
2
2V –3.34446 0.754734 –0.035494 0.008010 –4.43132 0.011410
fund 2.36684 0.737060 0.384666 0.119789 3.21120 0.032552
sin e –0.45574 0.147243 –0.351038 0.113415 –3.09517 0.036391
Table 1b. The results of regression of contributions from the members of the Investor Compensation 
Fund (Bulgaria) ( )c  from its volume ( )x
8N =
Regression results for dependent variable: contributions   
(data matrix 1) 
.99845258;R =  2 .99690756.R =  Corrected 2 .98917645.R =   
( )5, 2 128.95;F =  .00771.p <  Standard error of estimate: .6753.
BETA
Standard 
error 
BETA
B Standard error B ( )2t -levelp
Free term – – 1.163151 0.150964 7.7048 0.016431
2
2v –3.13421 0.249267 –0.037658 0.002995 –12.5737 0.006266
cos x 0.74691 0.047146 0.638575 0.040307 15.8426 0.003961
sin e –0.64595 0.053633 –0.563300 0.046770 –12.0439 0.006823
fund 1.84964 0.235196 0.340333 0.043276 7.8643 0.015787
2
3v 0.25069 0.047904 0.444680 0.084973 5.2332 0.034629
Table 1c. The results of regression of operating costs of the Investor  
Compensation Fund (Bulgaria) ( )e  from the volume of the fund ( )x
8N =
Regression results for dependent variable: costs  (data matrix 1) 
.98371013;R =  2 .96768562.R =  Corrected 2 .95475986.R =   
( ) ;2, 5 74.865F =  .00019.p <  Standard error of estimate: .01722.
BETA
Standard 
error 
BETA
B Standard error B ( )5t -levelp
Free term – – 0.076651 0.017357 4.41617 0.006917
fund 0.904466 0.087002 0.020753 0.001996 10.39596 0.000142
sin e –0.173049 0.087002 –0.018818 0.009461 –1.98903 0.103378
Distribution: Excesses
Expected normal
N
u
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b
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o
f
o
b
se
rv
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n
s
-0,2 -0,1 0,0 0,1 0,2 0,3
0
1
2
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Distribution: Excesses
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2
2
2
0.968081 0.035494 0.384666
0.351038 sin min
1.163151 0.037658 0.638575 cos
0.5633 sin 0.340333
0.444680 (cos ) 1.012
0.076651 0.020753 0.018818 sin 0.427
0.076651 0.020753 0
y x x
x
c x x
x x
x
e x x
e x
= − ⋅ + ⋅ −
− ⋅ →
= − ⋅ + ⋅ −
− ⋅ + ⋅ +
+ ⋅ ≥
= + ⋅ − ⋅ ≤
= + ⋅ − .018818 sin 0.201
0.05
, 0
x
x
a
x y
⋅ ≥
≥
≥













Target function 
( )y  0.7697
Level of fund 
( )x  11.8542
Fee limitations ( )b 1.0120 > = 1.01
Operating cost 
limitations ( )c  0.3350 < = 0.43
c > = 0.20
Level of fund 
limitation 0,0826 > = 0.05
x > 0
2. SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION CORPORATION  
(UNITED STATES OF AMERICA) 
Table 2a. The results of regression of the standard deviation of the size  
of the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) ( )y  from its volume ( )x
12N =
Regression results for dependent variable: risk (USA target function) 
0.96807254;R =  2 0.93716444.R =  Corrected 2 0.88480148.R =   
( )5, 6 17.897;F =  .00151.p <  Standard error of estimate: .14029.
BETA Standard error BETA B
Standard 
error B ( )6t -levelp
Free term – – 5272.7 9095.30 0.57972 0.583201
2x 1.171863 0.265365 0.0 0.00 4.41604 0.004490
( )3sin x 1.263864 0.364210 89170.4 25696.40 3.47015 0.013301
sin x –0.763928 0.335326 –41060.8 18023.63 –2.27816 0.062958
x –0.410631 0.278505 –0.4 0.25 –1.47441 0.190812
( )2sin x 0.162321 0.123968 21390.4 16336.31 1.30938 0.238310
Table 2b. The results of regression for contributions of the members  
of the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) ( )c  from its volume ( )x
12N =
Regression results for dependent variable: contributions  
(USA contributions)
 0.95824790;R =  2 0.91823904.R =  Corrected 2 0.82012589.R =   
( )6, 5 9.3590;F =  .01335.p <  Standard error of estimate: 88.409.
BETA Standard error BETA B
Standard 
error B ( )5t -levelp
Free term – – 288.984 95.5506 3.02441 0.029268
cos x 2.43073 0.463198 755.688 144.0034 5.24771 0.003333
( )3cos x –1.99237 0.476872 –911.702 218.2152 –4.17800 0.008672
x 1.72392 1.703101 0.008 0.0079 1.01222 0.357880
2x 6.61434 2.914997 0.000 0.0000 2.26907 0.072523
3x –8.11634 4.466408 –0.000 0.0000 –1.81720 0.128873
( )2sin x –0.32704 0.199365 –217.341 132.4930 –1.64040 0.161847
Distribution: Excesses
Expected normal
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Table 2c. The results of regression for operating costs of the Securities Investor Protection 
Corporation (SIPC) ( )e  from the fund’s volume ( )x
12N =
Regression results for dependent variable: costs 
(USA operating expenses)
 0.98131437;R =  
2 0.96297789.R =  Corrected 2 0.89818919.R =   
( )7, 4 14.863;F =   .01014.p <  Standard error of estimate: 0.73062.
BETA Standard error BETA B
Standard 
error B ( )4t -levelp
Free term – – 11.91764 0.506143 23.54600 0.000019
cos x 1.9960 0.378669 6.81621 1.293137 5.27106 0.006208
( )3cos x –1.9551 0.371880 –9.82737 1.869245 –5.25740 0.006266
2x 12.6494 2.204999 0.00000 0.000000 5.73669 0.004574
3x –18.1455 3.377681 –0.00000 0.000000 –5.37217 0.005799
x 6.0110 1.281626 0.00030 0.000065 4.69013 0.009377
( )3sin x –0.3299 0.143218 –1.28923 0.559756 –2.30320 0.082648
( )2cos x –0.1540 0.152732 –1.12385 1.114950 –1.00799 0.370486
3
2
3
2
3
3
5272.7 89170.4 (sin ) 41060.8 sin
0.4 21390.4 (sin ) min
288.984 755.688 cos 911.702 (cos )
0.008 217.341 (sin ) 188.6
11.91764 6.81621 cos 9.82737 (cos )
0.0003 1.28923 (sin )
y x x
x x
c x x
x x
e x x
x x
= + ⋅ − ⋅ −
− ⋅ + ⋅ →
= + ⋅ − ⋅ +
+ ⋅ − ⋅ ≥
= + ⋅ − ⋅ +
+ ⋅ − ⋅ −
− 2
3
3
2
1.12385 (cos ) 19.74
11.91764 6.81621 cos 9.82737 (cos )
0.0003 1.28923 (sin )
1.12385 (cos ) 10.704
0.05
, 0
x
e x x
x x
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a
x y
⋅ ≤
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

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













Target 
function 
( )y  0.0602
Level  
of fund
 ( )x  
10895.6325
Fee limitations ( )b 413.3580 > = 188.60
Operating cost 
limitations ( )c  14.2073 < = 19.74
c > = 10.70
Level of fund 
limitation 0.0792 > = 0.05
x > 0
Distribution: Excesses
Expected normal
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3. INVESTOR COMPENSATION FUND (CHECH REPUBLIC)
Table 3a. The results of regression for the standard deviation of the size of the Investor 
Compensation Fund (Czech Republic) ( )y  from its volume ( )x
9N =
Regression results for dependent variable: risk (Czech Republic target 
function) 
0.92857026;R =  2 0.86224273.R =  Corrected 2 0.81632364.R =   
( )2, 6 18.777;F =  .00261.p <  Standard error of estimate: 12.921.
BETA Standard error BETA B
Standard 
error B ( )6t -levelp
Free term – – 40.0923 6.708399 5.97643 0.000985
2x 0.944546 0.154160 0.0002 0.000033 6.12704 0.000864
sin x –0.192043 0.154160 –10.1664 8.160959 –1.24573 0.259300
Table 3b. The results of regression for contributions from the members of Investor Compensation 
Fund (Czech Republic) contributions regression ( )c  from its volume ( )x
11N =
Regression results for dependent variable: contributions (data matrix 1) 
.93429652;R =  
2 .87290999.R =  Corrected 2 .78818332.R =   
( )4, 6 10.303;F =  .00743.p <  Standard error of estimate: 15.094.
BETA Standard error BETA B
Standard 
error B ( )6t -levelp
Free term – – 37.7815 20.49957 1.84304 0.114894
fund 3.32966 1.262946 0.4685 0.17769 2.63643 0.038725
cos –0.36593 0.183583 –14.9621 7.50621 –1.99329 0.093289
4
2V 2.85853 1.051306 0.0000 0.00000 2.71903 0.034687
2
2V –5.10639 2.140771 –0.0008 0.00035 –2.38530 0.054373
Table 3c. The results of regression for operating costs of the Investor  
Compensation Fund (Czech Republic) ( )e  from the volume of the fund ( )x
9N =
Regression results for dependent variable: costs (Czech Republic 
operating expenses)  
0.98013760;R =  2 0.96066972.R =  Corrected 2 0.94755963.R =   
( )2, 6 73.277;F =  .00006.p <  Standard error of estimate: 1.8920.
BETA Standard error BETA B
Standard 
error B ( )6t -levelp
Free term – – 43.64289 1.461285 29.8661 0.000000
x –0.974979 0.081129 –0.04515 0.003757 –12.0177 0.000020
sin x 0.180333 0.081129 2.61620 1.176981 2.2228 0.067935
2
2
40.0923 0.0002 10.1664 sin min
37.7815 0.4685 14.9621 cos 0.0008 92.22
43.64289 0.04515 2.6162 sin 46.2
43.64289 0.04515 2.6162 sin 22.16
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c > = 22.16
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4. FINANCIAL SERVICES COMPENSATION SCHEME  
(UNITED KINGDOM)
Table 4a. The results of regression for standard deviation of the size  
of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) ( )y  from its volume ( )x
9N =
Regression results for dependent variable: risk (United Kingdom 
target function) 
0.99921163;R =  2 0.99842389.R =  Corrected 2 0.99684778.R =   
( )4, 4 633.47;F =  .00001.p <  Standard error of estimate: 18.065.
BETA
Standard 
error 
BETA
B Standard error B ( )4t -levelp
Free term – – 7.47636 13.39856 0.5580 0.606601
x 2.83842 0.124808 0.10010 0.00440 22.7423 0.000022
3x –1.90910 0.127825 –0.0000000002 0.00000 –14.9353 0.000117
sin x 0.06022 0.025227 29.16398 12.21778 2.3870 0.075412
( )3cos x 0.04558 0.027803 25.25500 15.40588 1.6393 0.176492
Table 4b. The results of regression for contributions of the members  
of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) ( )c  from its volume ( )x
13N =
Regression results for dependent variable: costs (United Kingdom 
contributions)
 0.94102557;R =  
2 0.88552912.R =  Corrected 2 0.84737216.R =   
( )3, 9 23.208;F =  .00014.p <  Standard error of estimate: 164.25.
BETA
Standard 
error 
BETA
B Standard error B ( )9t -levelp
Free term – – 15.4310 95.10092 0.16226 0.874686
x 3.81874 0.675818 0.1740 0.03079 5.65055 0.000313
3x –3.14969 0.654141 –0.0000000004 0.00000 –4.81500 0.000954
cos x 0.19202 0.158748 117.6476 97.26410 1.20957 0.257257
Table 4c. The results of regression for operating costs  
of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) ( )e  from the volume of the fund ( )x
13N =
Regression results for dependent variable: costs (data matrix 1) 
.94633921;R =  2 .89555789.R =  Corrected 2 .87466947.R =   
( )2,10 42.873;F =  .00001.p <  Standard error of estimate: 7.9940.
BETA
Standard 
error 
BETA
B Standard error B ( )10t -levelp
Free term – – 15.97801 3.648719 4.37907 0.001379
fund 4.86726 0.832924 0.01191 0.002038 5.84358 0.000163
2
2V –4.09637 0.832924 –0.0000005289 0.000000 –4.91806 0.000607
Distribution: Excesses
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5. THE FONDS DEGARANTIEDES DÉPÔTS ET  
DE RÉSOLUTION (FRANCE)
Table 5a. The results of regression for standard deviation of the size of the The Fonds degarantiedes 
dépôts et de résolution (FGDR) (France) ( )y  from its volume ( )x
11N =
Regression results for dependent variable: risk (France target 
function) 
0.93293925;R =  2 0.87037565.R =  Corrected 2 0.81482235.R =   
( )3, 7 15.667;F =  .00173.p <  Standard error of estimate: 61.656.
BETA
Standard 
error 
BETA
B Standard error B ( )7t -levelp
Free term – – –1638.5854400113 355.4743 –4.60958 0.002456
x 4.43839 0.912727 1.0707154794 0.2202 4.86278 0.001829
3x –3.77953 0.922843 –0.0000000464 0.0000 –4.09553 0.004599
( )2cos x 0.22417 0.147086 109.0852609585 71.5737 1.52410 0.171308
Table 5b. The results of regression for contributions of the members of the Fonds de Guarantee des 
Dépôts et de Résolution (FGDR) (France) ( )c  from its volume ( )x
13N =
Regression results for dependent variable: contributions  
(France contributions) 
0.94068591;R =  2 0.88488998.R =  Corrected 2 0.86186798.R =   
( )2,10 38.437;F =  .00002.p <  Standard error of estimate: 67.968.
BETA
Standard 
error 
BETA
B Standard error B ( )10t -levelp
Free term – – –1678.4121280469 266.5725 –6.29627 0.000090
x 4.23905 0.645827 1.1169765190 0.1702 6.56375 0.000064
3x –3.55647 0.645827 –0.0000000451 0.0000 –5.50685 0.000259
3
3
3
2
y 7.47636 0.1001 0.0000000002
29.16398 cos 25.255 (sin ) min
15.4310 0.1740 117.6476 cos
0.000000000 608.17
e 15.97801 0.01191 0.0000005289 85.76
e 15.97801 0.01191 0.0000005289
x x
x x
c x x
x
x x
x
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760.3547
Level of fund 
( )x  15969.8478
Fee limitations ( )b 1115.0855 > = 608.17
Operating cost 
limitations ( )c  71.2903 < = 85.76
c > = 33.13
Level of fund limitation 0.1324 > = 0.05
x > 0
Distribution: Excesses
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Table 5c. The results of regression for operating costs of The Funds of the Guarantee for Dépôts et de 
Résolution (FGDR) (France) ( )e  from the fund’s volume ( )x
13N =
Regression results for dependent variable: costs (France operating 
expenses) 
0, 99612366;R =  2 0, 99226234.R =  Corrected 2 0, 99071481R =   
( )2,10 641,19;F =  , 00000.p <  Standard error of estimate: 0,13861
BETA
Standard 
error 
BETA
B Standard error B ( )10t -levelp
Free term – – 1.353283 0.056494 23.95433 0.000000
3x 0.994754 0.027823 0.0000000001 0.000000 35.75305 0.000000
cos x –0.035207 0.027823 –0.064006 0.050581 –1.26541 0.234414
3
2
3
3
3
1638.58544 1.07072 0.0000000464
109.08526 (cos ) min
1678.41213 1.116977 0.0000000451 143.84
1.353283 0.0000000001 0.064006 cos 6.98
1.353283 0.0000000001 0.064006 cos 2.27
y x x
x
c x x
e x x
e x x
x
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0.05
, 0
a
x y
≥
≥









Target 
function 
( )y  
4.5794
Level of 
fund ( )x  3509.1649
Fee limitations ( )b  292.3519 > = 143.84
Operating cost 
limitations ( )c  5.7386 < = 6.98
c > = 2.27
Level of fund 
limitations 0.0573 > = 0.05
x > 0
6. INVESTOR COMPENSATION COMPANY LIMITED (IRELAND)
Table 6a. The results of regression for standard deviation of the size of the Investor Compensation 
Company Limited (Ireland) ( )y  from its volume ( )x
12N =
Regression results for dependent variable: risk (Ireland target 
function) 
0.97927491;R =  2 0.95897935.R =  Corrected 2 0.92479548.R =   
( )5, 6 28.054;F =  .00043.p <  Standard error of estimate: 272.48.
BETA Standard error BETA B
Standard 
error B ( )6t -levelp
Free term – – –5472.023510 1113.588 –4.91387 0.002673
x 14.4732 1.926448 1.217279 0.162 7.51287 0.000288
2x –25.8000 4.082374 –0.000043 0.000 –6.31984 0.000733
3x 12.4863 2.278247 0.0000000005 0.000 5.48067 0.001542
cos x 1.2016 0.306005 1773.422915 451.633 3.92669 0.007742
( )3cos x –0.8348 0.284662 –1612.871341 549.988 –2.93256 0.026200
Distribution: Excesses
Expected normal
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Table 6b. The results of regression for contributions of the members of the Investor Compensation 
Company Limited (Ireland) ( )c  from its volume ( )x
14N =
Regression results for dependent variable: contributions (Ireland 
contributions) 
0.97108080;R =  2 0.94299792.R =  Corrected 2 0.92589729.R =   
( )3,10 55.144;F =  .00000.p <  Standard error of estimate: 268.57.
BETA Standard error BETA B
Standard 
error B ( )10t -levelp
Free term – – 2820.037854 224.1513 12.58096 0.000000
x 0.914981 0.089921 0.066207 0.0065 10.17535 0.000001
( )3cos x –0.144858 0.096363 –272.555946 181.3119 –1.50324 0.163682
( )2sin x 0.109150 0.084475 287.200714 222.2754 1.29209 0.225385
Table 6c. The results of regression for operating costs of Investor Compensation Company Limited 
(Ireland) ( )e  from the fund’s volume ( )x
14N =
Regression results for dependent variable: costs (France operating 
expenses) 
0.92834912;R =  
2 0.86183208.R =  Corrected 2 0.85031809.R =   
( )1,12 74.851;F =  .00000.p <  Standard error of estimate: 136.74.
BETA
Standard 
error 
BETA
B Standard error B ( )12t -levelp
Free term – – 421.799015 82.98615 5.082764 0.000269
x 0.928349 0.107303 0.024065 0.00278 8.651638 0.000002
2
3
3
3
2
y 5472.02351 1.217279 0.000043
0.0000000005 1773.422915 cos
1612.871341 (cos ) min
2820.037854 0.066207 272.555946 (cos )
287.200714 (sin ) 3838.02
421.799015 0.024065 1839.6
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Distribution: Excesses
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7. INVESTOR COMPENSATION SCHEME (MALTA)
Table 7a. The results of regression for standard deviation of the size of the Investor Compensation 
Scheme (Malta) ( )y  from its volume ( )x
9N =
Regression results for dependent variable: risk  (Malta target 
function)
 0.94995547;R =  
2 0.90241540.R =  Corrected 2 0.86988719.R =   
( )2, 6 27.743;F =  .00093.p <  Standard error of estimate: 91.487.
BETA Standard error BETA B
Standard 
error B ( )6t -levelp
Free term – – –6.591868 58.28564 –0.113096 0.913644
2x 0.903620 0.127585 0.000103 0.00001 7.082487 0.000397
( )2sin x 0.267860 0.127585 149.836478 71.36898 2.099462 0.080538
Table 7b. The results of regression for contributions of the members of the Investor Compensation 
Scheme (Malta) ( )c  from its volume ( )x
12N =
Regression results for dependent variable: contributions  (Malta 
contributions) 
0.91134132;R =  
2 0.83054300.R =  Corrected 2 0.76699662.R =   
( )3, 8 13.070;F =  .00189.p <  Standard error of estimate: 56.729.
BETA Standard error BETA B
Standard 
error B ( )8t -levelp
Free term – – 19.852382 37.0607 0.53567 0.606753
x 0.82413 0.175202 0.123754 0.0263 4.70388 0.001534
sin x –1.12327 0.689107 –188.643258 115.7297 –1.63003 0.141742
( )3sin x 0.98221 0.718506 185.253272 135.5160 1.36702 0.208794
Table 7c. The results of regression for operating costs of the Investor Compensation Scheme (Malta) 
e  from the volume of the fund ( )x
10N =
Regression results for dependent variable: costs  (Malta operating 
expenses) 
0.97357558;R =  2 0.94784940.R =  Corrected 2 0.92177411.R =   
( )3, 6 36.350;F =  .00030.p <  Standard error of estimate: 1.6822.
BETA
Standard 
error 
BETA
B Standard error B ( )6t -levelp
Free term – – 1.36112643 1.431875 0.95059 0.378516
x 2.15463 0.334204 0.01523202 0.002363 6.44704 0.000659
2x –1.31176 0.334227 –0.00000345 0.000001 –3.92477 0.007759
( )2sin x 0.12968 0.093317 1.58555314 1.140977 1.38965 0.214007
Distribution: Excesses
Expected normal
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2
2
3
2
2
6.591868 0.000103
149.836478 (sin ) min
19.852382 0.123754 188.643258 sin
185.253272 (sin ) 158.83
1.361126 0.015232 0.00000345
1.585553 (sin ) 42.46
1.361126 0.015232 0.00000
y x
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c x x
x
e x x
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2
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1.585553 (sin ) 13.6
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Target 
function ( )y  393.0507
Level of fund 
( )x  
1969.7772
Fee limitations ( )b  263.3591 > = 158.83
Operating cost 
limitations ( )c  17.9787 < = 42.46
c > = 13.60
Level of fund limitations 0.0928 > = 0.05
x > 0
